State Customs Committee of Russian Federation N. Kravchenko

State Customs Committee of Russian Federation
Customs control of ferrous and non-ferrous metal scrap
Chief of Customs control of fissionable and radioactive materials of SCC of RF
N. Kravchenko
Directorate of Special Technique and Automation of Customs
Technologies
11/5, Novozavodskaya str., Moscow, 121087, Russia
Tel.: +7 (095) 730-06-19 Fax.: +7 (095) 449-88-62 E-mail: ustatt_Kravchenko@mail.customs.ru
The threat of ITRM at the border
can be minimized by the
implementation of two tasks:
– To stop the illicit trafficking of fissionable and
radioactive materials across the Russian Federation
border;
– To organize thorough check at Customs clearance of
fissionable and radioactive materials of the
participants of foreign trade activities (export, import,
transit, temporary import) for their identification by
name and quantity declared in the documents.
The following conceptual principles
are used as well for solving these
tasks:
• 1. Radiation monitoring of all individuals, goods, and
vehicles crossing the Russian Federation customs border;
• 2. Priority of radiation safety activities over legal activities
aiming to institute criminal proceedings against law
transgressors;
• 3. Effective control not deteriorating conditions for the
participants of foreign trade activities;
• 4. Minimization of additional personnel and funds allocation;
• 5. Utilization mostly of national technical facilities.
Stages of radiation Customs
control
No.
stage
Purpose
Measurement
Methods,
instruments
Results
I
Detection
Gamma, neutron,
bremsstrahlung
Remote, stationary
II
Localization,
danger
evaluation
Gamma, neutron,
alpha, beta
Remote (contact),
portable
III
Identification
Gamma
IV
Dose
monitoring
Gamma
Contact, without
opening of package
stationary (portable)
Contact, portable
Qualitative
evaluation “YESNO”
Localization of
situation of the
radiation source,
quantitative
evaluation of
radiation level
Determination of
isotope
composition
Personal (group)
equivalent dose
The technical facilities can be listed as
follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
• Detection:
1. Stationary remote automatic equipment for detection of the excess in
natural gamma-neutron background;
2. Portable universal radiometers of alpha-, beta-, gamma-, and neutron
radiation;
• Analysis:
3. Potable gamma-spectrometers for identification of fissionable and
radioactive materials without opening the package;
4. Gamma-spectrometers with high-resolution semiconductor detectors for
movable customs laboratories;
• Personal:
5. Personal dosimeters to provide safety of the personnel;
6. Personal protection means.
Algorithm of radiation monitoring at
unauthorized transportation of FRM
ENTRANCE
I stage
Detection
«NO»
Presence of radioactive
(r/a) radiation
Automated monitoring
(stationary equipment)
Inspected by: officer of the
checkpoint
«YES»
II stage
Evaluation of
radiation
danger
Inspection area
III stage
Localization,
identification
Site of temporary
storage
Determination of the type of radiation
and the extent of radiation danger
Checking of the taken measures for
temporary storage of goods
Localization and identification (composition,
enrichment)
Transfer of goods to competent bodies
Customs
formalities
EXIT
Inspection of goods with
portable instruments
(radiometers, personal dose
monitoring of the personnel)
Inspected by: officer of the
checkpoint
Composition analysis
(spectrometric equipment)
Inspected by: officer of the
CCFRM service; expert of
special organization
Approach of implementation TF
DR NRM
Border - Detection of minimally possible amounts of NRM with the use of gamma and neutron
radiation detectors in accordance with the work technique of check posts.
1. Critical width and height of control zone:
- For transport stationary TF DR NRM – width up to 6 meters, height up to 3.5 meters,
carrier speed up to 15 kilometers per hour.
- For pedestrian TF DR NRM – width up to 1.5 meters, height up to 2 meters, object speed
up to 5 kilometers per hour.
2. Maximum automation of TF DR NRM control process, reduction of human factor
influence on reliability of control.
3. Taking into account the specificity of customs service activities, which is directed to
maximum economic benefits for national interests, minimization of the time of control
with the use of TF DR NRM along with high reliability of control, obligatory recording of
control results, provision and storage of video information about the control object.
- Absence of competent body or specialized services representatives during control with
the use of TF DR NRM.
Possibility to implement TF DR NRM in unfavorable climatic conditions (open sites).
Stationary technical facilities for detection and response to
illegal trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials
implemented at borders
•
Typical national check post and possible places of
TF DR NRM arrangement.
Transport monitor
stationary
Transport monitor
Pedestrian monitor
Stationary TF DR NRM are arranged at entrance/exit of check post.
Examples of placement TF DR NRM
Example of placement of pedestrian TF DR NRM.
Fixed, installed
instruments
Hand-held and
pocket-type
instruments
Response to Alarm Activation
Ответные меры при срабатывании системы обнаружения
Alarm (pager, border monitor, intelligence)
Сигнал (пейджер, пограничный монитор, данные из отдела
дознания)
False Alarm
Ложное
срабатывание
Multi-purpose
hand-held
devices
Универсальные
ручные приборы
No
Отрицательный
результат
Verification
Проверка
Confirmed or
Suspected
Подтверждено или
предполагается
Assess Hazard &
Locate Source
Оценка угрозы и
локализация
источника
Dangerous Опасный
Safety Procedures Меры безопасности
No Danger
Отсутствие
опасности
Isolate Source Изоляция источника
Notification Procedures
Меры уведомления
Innocent Source
Активность менее МЗА
Record Details
Запись особенностей
Identify
Source
Illicit Source Незаконно перевозимый источник
Activate Emergency
Response Plan
Приведение в исполнение
плана ответных мер
Seize Materials Задержание источника
Stop
Окончание процедуры
In-depth investigation Углубленное обследование
Investigation Report Доклад о проведении обследования
Legal Process Проведение уголовного дознания
MKC-A02-1M, All-in-one Design
(Aspect)
•4 modes of operation:
– n/g search mode
– n/g dose rate
indication
– Gamma spectrometryisotope identification
– Alpha/beta counting
Detectors: NaI, He-3 (8 at) and
(external detection
external, thin wall, large area
probe)
ZnS covered plastic szintillator
•Normal (4 buttons) and
expert mode of operation
Detection illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and goods
with` a high level of radioactivity (including scrap)
1996-2003
other
19%
With radiation
equipments
81%
Prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and goods with` a
high level of radioactivity (including scrap)
Import to RUSSIA and
transit
Export from RUSSIA
21,3%
78,7%
1. IAEA-TECDOC-1311 Prevention of the inadvertent
movement and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.
2. IAEA-TECDOC-1312 Detection of radioactive
materials at borders.
3. IAEA-TECDOC-1313 Response to events involving
the inadvertent movement or illicit trafficking of
radioactive materials.
4. The sanitary demands of Russian Ministry of Health.
The stages of scrap Customs control
SCRAP
(Tariff classification code: 7204, 7404, 7503, 7602
e.c.t.)
Customs
examination with
special radiation
equipment
Main tasks:
Customs control of cargo
documents
-To find out local radioactive sources;
- To measure dose rate;
-Selected measurement of the levels of
surface contamination by alpha and beta
radionuclide.
- Sanitary certificate
- Transport documents
CRITERION:
Dose rate  natural
background
- № and Date of issue of document;
- Full name of organization – recipient;
- weight and kind of scrap;
- Number of transport units, identification №;
- Full name of Laboratory of Radiation Control provided
measuring;
- № of radiation protocols and dose rate;
- Conations of using of scrap.
All documents are present
- Scrap meets sanitary demands
ISSUE OF SCRAP
+ 0,2 µSv/h.
Sanitary certificate is absent and (or) dose
rate is not correspond to criterion
Prohibition of issue
The graph which shows how the number of cases of detection of
illicit trafficking of scrap depends on the level of equipment
customs houses with the radiation monitoring technique
80,00%
Quantity of the found out facts
70,00%
60
60,00%
the number of cases of
detection of illicit
trafficking of scrap
50,00%
the level of
equipment customs
houses with the
radiation monitoring
technique
40
20
40,00%
30,00%
20,00%
10,00%
0
0,00%
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
The level of equipment customs houses
with the radiation monitoring technique
80
The number of cases of scrap return from Russia to other
countries and from other countries to Russia
The number of cases of scrap return
80
The number of cases of
scrap return from Russia
to other countries
70
60
50
The number of cases of
scrap return from other
countries to Russia
40
30
20
10
0
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003